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The Rise of NGO Activism†
By Julien Daubanes and Jean-Charles Rochet*
Activist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly 
oppose firms’ practices. We suggest this might be related to the vul-
nerability of public regulation to corporate influence. We examine a 
potentially harmful industrial project subject to regulatory approval. 
Under industry influence, the regulator may approve the project even 
though it is harmful. However, an NGO may oppose it. We charac-
terize the circumstances under which NGO opposition occurs and 
under which it is socially beneficial. Our theory explains the role that 
NGOs have assumed in the last decades, and has implications for the 
social legitimacy of activism and the appropriate degree of transpar-
ency of industrial activities. (JEL D21, D74, D82, L31, L51)
Activist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly influence indus-trial decisions. These NGOs are consumer associations, environmental groups, 
and stakeholders’ advocacy groups that seek to prevent harmful projects and prac-
tices.1 They often convince firms to “self-regulate” when public regulation seems 
too lax. For example, companies such as Nike (early 1990s), Citigroup (2004), and 
HSBC (2012) significantly strengthened their social, environmental, and risk crite-
ria after NGO intervention. Similarly, in 2013, Starbucks offered to pay taxes that 
it was not legally liable for, and, in 2015, Dunkin’ Donuts stopped using poten-
tially toxic nanoparticles allowed by the US Food and Drug Administration. Among 
1 A famous example of such opposition is the 1995 Greenpeace-Shell conflict over the dismantlement of the 
Brent Spar oil platform. Ironically in that case, the option ultimately chosen by the firm under NGO pressure turned 
out to be worse than the option initially approved by regulators.
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other  contemporary issues, the release of endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) 
by industry is center stage: although the inaction of public regulators—and the 
influence of the industry—is often denounced, under NGO pressure an increasing 
number of companies is committing to the goal of zero EDCs discharge—e.g., the 
Adidas Group.
By “NGO activism,” we refer to the advocacy and militancy of civil society 
through not-for-profit organizations that are independent of public authorities and 
special interests.2 , 3 In general, NGO activists do not rely on the public order. They 
do “private politics,” to use the words of Baron (2001): to oppose firms’ projects 
and practices that they disapprove of, they use their private potential to harm these 
firms. This potential can be achieved in various ways—e.g., boycotts, naming and 
shaming, cyber activism, etc.4
NGOs’ rising influence is one of the most significant changes in business over 
the past four decades (see Doh and Guay 2006, among others),5 with obvious impli-
cations for corporate management. Now more than ever, conflicts with NGOs do 
not only threaten firms’ current business—for empirical evidence, see, for example, 
King and Soule (2007) and Harrison and Scorse (2010)—but are also costly in the 
long run in terms of reputation and brand value. Clearly, the risk of NGO opposition 
has become one of the most concerning threats for corporations, which management 
seeks to understand, anticipate, and address adequately. For a broad review on the 
strategic management of threats to business, see Gans and Kaplan’s (2017) book; on 
the case of NGOs’ reputation-destroying attacks, see also Culling (2017).
This paper puts forward an explanation for the rising influence of NGO activists. 
We model a firm that hopes to implement a project requiring the approval of a public 
regulator. The regulator may be influenced by the industry’s interests, and thus may 
accept the firm’s project even though it is socially harmful. An NGO may decide to 
oppose the project on the basis of its own information. NGO involvement impacts 
both the efficiency of public regulation and the economic performance of the indus-
try. We characterize the conditions under which the NGO effectively opposes the 
project and the conditions under which this opposition improves social welfare. Our 
results, therefore, have not only implications for the occurrence of NGO activism, 
but also for its legal status.
Our view of NGO activism is reminiscent of Galbraith’s (1952) notion of “coun-
tervailing power” that operates in the face of too-powerful industries: we depart 
from the outdated description of a society in which public regulation alone resolves 
market failures. More precisely, our theory holds that public regulation becomes 
vulnerable to industry lobbying as economic stakes grow, and that this induces NGO 
2 This definition excludes trade unions, which seek to generate gains for their members. It also excludes not-
for-profit organizations whose funding is politically motivated—see, for example, Bertrand et al.’s (2018) recent 
empirical evidence of political influence through corporate philanthropy.
3 We do not address other important facets of NGO activity; for example, on the provision of independent label-
ling services, see Heyes and Martin (2016) and the references therein.
4 Activists’ private nuisance potential sometimes also relies on the public order, as when activists file a lawsuit 
against a firm.
5 For example, according to the Covalence Ethical Quote NGO database, 831 NGOs have leveled more than 
18,000 criticisms against companies worldwide between 2002 and 2014. The data consist of negative reports pub-
lished by NGOs against companies—see online Appendix A for a detailed description.
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activists to enter. In the presence of an NGO, public regulation may recover its 
resistance to the industry’s interests. Otherwise, activists oppose industrial projects 
directly, and do so in a way that depends on both their mobilization efficiency and 
the transparency of the industry. NGO opposition is socially costly for two rea-
sons. First, activists’ mobilization consumes economic resources. Second, activists 
may mistakenly oppose socially beneficial projects due to both their bias and their 
imperfect information. However, when an NGO is sufficiently efficient and suffi-
ciently well informed, it has the potential to improve social welfare. Our theory rests 
on a relationship between industry lobbying and NGO mobilization, for which we 
present some statistics in online Appendix A. Our theoretical predictions as to the 
entry of NGO activists and their welfare impact are used to explain and analyze the 
increasing involvement of NGOs in several industries over the past decades.
Baron (2001, 2003) was the first to propose a theory of private politics. He 
assumes that activists pursue social objectives. Their motivation may arise from 
moral preferences (Baron 2010), or from prosocial behavior à la Bénabou and Tirole 
(2006), and may depend on how well activists subscribe to the issue (Besley and 
Ghatak 2005). Baron (2010) shows how NGOs can emerge when socially concerned 
individuals coordinate their efforts in the spirit of Dixit (2004, ch. 3) and Tabellini 
(2008). When firms are targeted by activists, they may “self-regulate” to forestall 
this opposition and avoid the associated damages.
Recent papers that shed light on the relation between public regulation and pri-
vate politics are complementary to our research. For example, Maxwell, Lyon, and 
Hackett (2000) studies how firms may self-regulate to avoid a strengthening of 
regulation inspired by activists. Following Baron (2003) and Baron and Diermeier 
(2007), we consider instead the alternative case in which NGOs oppose firms 
directly rather than by lobbying regulators. Indeed, over the period 2002–2014, for 
example, US-based NGOs’ lobbying expenditures amounted to $2.3 billion, while 
lobbying expenditures by US-based companies exceeded $36 billion.6 One reason 
is that NGOs cannot match large firms’ financial power. For example, Baron and 
Diermeier (2007, 600) reports the following statement by Greenpeace’s former 
head, Paul Gilding, to the New York Times (June 2, 2001):
The smart activists are now saying, “O.K., you want to play markets—
let’s play.” [Lobbying the government] takes forever and can easily be 
counter-lobbied by corporations. . . . After all, consumers do have choices 
where they buy their gas, and there are differences now. Shell and BP 
Amoco . . . both withdrew from the oil industry lobby that has been dis-
missing climate change.
Another reason for focusing on NGOs’ direct confrontation with firms is that the 
internet and social networks have facilitated the dissemination of information and 
6 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. The above amounts are expressed in constant (2014) dollars; we have 
used the CPI-U consumer price index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. To assess NGOs’ lobbying expenditures, 
we have added the expenditures of all nonprofit organizations and the expenditures concerning various issues on 
which NGOs oppose the industry: human rights, the environment, foreign and defense policy, gun control, women’s 
issues, and miscellaneous issues.
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lowered the cost of NGO opposition (Yu 2005).7 Lyon and Salant (2015) shows that 
NGO opposition is likely to reduce industries’ subsequent influence on regulation. 
Finally, Egorov and Harstad (2017) studies the dynamics of the conflict between 
NGOs and firms, in a setup in which the intervention of a benevolent and indepen-
dent regulator can put an end to such conflicts.
We contribute to the above literature in three ways. First and foremost, our theory 
explains, rather than assumes, the presence and intervention of NGO activists. More 
precisely, our theory allows for the opposition of activists after public regulators 
have approved a firm’s project, as illustrated by our introductory examples. Our 
approach echoes Lyon and Maxwell’s (2003) examination of public policy’s alter-
natives in situations in which public regulation fails in the first place. In that sense, 
we contribute to answer the fundamental question why society relies on NGO oppo-
sition when externalities could have been resolved at the outset by public regulation. 
In our view, this is because the influence of firms on regulators is unavoidable, and 
can be counterbalanced by the direct intervention of NGO activists. Our contribution 
is complementary to the theory of Krautheim and Verdier (2016) who suggest that 
the proliferation of international NGOs has gone hand in hand with the process of 
globalization and firms’ offshoring to low-regulation areas; their explanation relies 
on the geographical limitation of domestic public regulation, rather than the vul-
nerability of public regulators to the influence of the industry. Second, we highlight 
the key role of information asymmetries between NGOs and regulated firms. More 
precisely, we extend Baron’s (2012) model of NGO opposition to the case in which 
activists’ assessment of external costs depends on both the limited information at 
their disposal and their perception of the regulators’ decisions. As Baron himself 
puts it (2003, 55), “the activist challenge to the firm begins with the identification of 
the issue.” Large industrial projects are often opaque and/or complex, and, unlike 
regulators, NGOs have no legal mandate to examine them. For example, Greenpeace 
significantly overestimated the quantity of oil left in the Brent Spar platform in 1995 
(5,000 tons instead of 50), because they had not collected enough samples during 
their illegal and perilous occupation of the platform. Third, our model takes into 
account that activists are essentially focused on external costs.
Whether NGO activism is optimal for society partly depends on the prevailing 
resistance of public regulation to the influence of the industry. In situations in which 
industrial interests have the potential to subvert public regulation, the economics of 
regulation has suggested that more regulation is needed to prevent harmful conduct, 
not only in developing countries (e.g., Stiglitz 1994), but also whenever regulatory 
capture is possible (Laffont and Tirole 1993, ch. 13).8 However, Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2003) shows that when law enforcement is weak, regulation may lead to corrup-
tion (see also Djankov et al. 2002). Similarly, when industry lobbying is intense, 
regulation enhances, rather than discourages, influence (e.g., Gibson Brandon and 
Padovani 2011). Our theory highlights NGOs’ possible role in  complementing 
7 On the role of public persuasion in NGO opposition, see, for example, Chiroleu-Assouline and Lyon (2016) 
and Couttenier et al. (2016).
8 Laffont (2005, 57), however, suggests that regulation should be adjusted to the stage of development: situ-
ations of weak law enforcement may require less sophisticated regulatory schemes, and thereby provide weaker 
incentives.
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 regulation. NGO opposition affects the performance of regulation in two basic ways. 
First, it renders public regulation less vulnerable to industrial interests, and second, 
it induces firms to self-regulate by abandoning their most hazardous projects. Yet the 
appeal of NGO intervention on top of public regulation relies on NGOs’ efficiency, 
in both identifying and opposing the most hazardous projects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a basic model in 
which public regulation can be influenced by the industry it supervises. Section II 
introduces NGO opposition. Section III examines the impact of NGO opposition 
on public regulation. Section IV assesses the vulnerability of public regulation with 
and without NGO opposition, and examines the circumstances under which NGO 
opposition arises and contributes to social welfare. Section V draws implications for 
the recent rise of NGOs, as well as policy implications about transparency and about 
the legal status of NGO activism. Section VI concludes.
Online Appendix A provides suggestive statistics about the relationship between 
industry lobbying and NGO mobilization in the United States. Online Appendix B 
gathers the proofs of the propositions that are not in the main text. Online Appendix 
C presents our view of corporate influence, the failure of regulators, and NGO activ-
ism in more details. Online Appendix D shows how our analysis accommodates 
more complex environments.
I. A Model of Public Regulation with Industry Influence
The recent performance of public regulators is mixed. For example, catastrophes 
such as the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil-drilling rig in 2010 and the 
Fukushima Daiichi disaster in 2011 suggest that regulators have sometimes failed 
to impose adequate standards on the industries they were supposed to monitor. 
Furthermore, these examples indicate a reason for this failure: industries can influ-
ence their regulators. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) shows that industries do influence 
public policies and regulations in their favor. This influence has mostly been docu-
mented for the banking sector in the empirical literature that emerged following the 
global financial crisis of 2007–2009.
In fact, there are two different views of the corporate lobbying process, with 
opposite implications about its social usefulness. On the one hand, a large part of the 
theoretical literature assumes that lobbyists are experts who produce and transmit 
information to uninformed policymakers—see, among others, the influential models 
of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Grossman and Helpman (2001). On the other 
hand, many believe that lobbyists seek to influence rather than inform. Indeed, anec-
dotal evidence suggests, and Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi’s (2014) empirical 
study confirms, that the success of a lobbyist is more a matter of connections than 
expertise. Moreover, our paper does not deal with legislators but with regulators, 
who are appointed for their expertise. For these two reasons, our model adopts the 
second view on lobbying, namely that it is about influence rather than information.
Precisely, we introduce influential industry lobbying into an otherwise standard 
model of public regulation. A single firm, representative of the industry, can under-
take some project. For example, the firm may implement a new operational unit or 
financial technique, release a new consumer product, etc. The project has a fixed 
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(exogenous) size  q > 0 . It generates both a net private value  vq > 0 that accrues 
to the industry and a net external cost  cq that is borne by the rest of society (e.g., 
consumers or workers).9 The external cost reflects the fact that a new operational 
unit, a new product or a new technique may turn hazardous for the environment, for 
consumers, or for financial stability.
There are two possibilities: either the project is good or it is bad, depending on 
whether the private value  vq covers or falls short of the external cost  cq . Precisely,
 { with probability   p L ,  the project is good, as its external cost is low: c =  c L < v;       with probability   p H ,  the project is bad, as its external cost is high: c =  c H > v.
 The firm would always undertake the project, since it generates a profit 
 vq > 0 . However, the project may be bad for society (when  c =  c H ). An expert—
the regulator—is delegated the decision to approve or reject the project,10 as in the 
two-tiered regulatory structures of Tirole (1986), Laffont and Tirole (1991), and 
Laffont (1994). This literature focuses on the asymmetry of information between 
the firm and the regulator regarding private production costs. By contrast, we focus 
on the external effects of the firm’s projects—e.g., on the environment, consum-
ers’ health, or the financial system—which are monitored by specialized regulatory 
agencies. In this context, we make the simplest assumption that the information 
available to the firm and the regulator is symmetric and perfect: both the firm 
and the regulator perfectly observe whether the project is good ( c =  c L ) or bad ( c =  c H ). In particular, this means that there is no moral hazard; for an analysis of 
more complex situations in which firms’ hidden actions can influence the external 
costs of their projects, see Hiriart, Martimort, and Pouyet (2010).
The original feature of our model is lobbying: the industry can ex ante (i.e., 
before the external cost is observed) influence the preferences of the regulator by 
making lobbying expenditures  e ≥ 0 . In the spirit of Hiriart and Martimort (2012), 
we assume that lobbying causes the regulator to be biased in favor of the industry. 
Denoting by  π = vq and   = cq , respectively, the firm’s profit and the external 
cost borne by the rest of society when the project is undertaken, the total surplus 
generated by the project is  π −  . Under the industry’s influence, however, the reg-
ulator pursues the biased objective11
(1)   =  (1 + α (e) ) π −  =  [ (1 + α (e) ) v − c] q, 
9 The net private value is the difference between the private revenue and the private cost of the industry. The net 
external cost is the difference between the social cost (due to health or environmental damages, for example) and 
the benefit of stakeholders (e.g., consumers or workers) who bear this social cost.
10 Our simple model assumes that a rejected project is not undertaken. Were a project modified after a rejection, 
it would be considered as a new one.
11 The regulator’s objective need not integrate the ex ante lobbying expenditures of the industry, which are 
sunk at the moment of the regulatory decision to accept or reject the project. Those expenditures will, however, be 
considered later in our analysis of social welfare.
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where the regulatory bias  α (e) ≥ 0 positively depends on the firm’s lobbying 
expenditures  e ≥ 0 . We assume a linear influence function
(2)  α (e) =  e _i , 
where the parameter  i > 0 should be interpreted as the marginal cost of influ-
ence. When  e = 0 , there is no lobbying, and the regulator is not influenced at all: 
 α (0) = 0 . In that case, the objective (1) coincides with the surplus  π −  gener-
ated by the project and the regulator allows the project when it is good and rejects 
it otherwise.
Lobbying takes place when  e > 0 , which leads the regulator to give the extra 
weight  α (e) > 0 to the industry’s profit relative to the external cost. Sufficient lob-
bying expenditures can induce the regulator to approve the project not only when it 
is good, but also when it is bad. In the absence of an NGO, we obtain the following 
proposition, whose proof is presented in online Appendix B.
PROPOSITION 1 (Regulation and lobbying with no NGO): In the absence of an 
NGO,
 (i) The regulator approves a bad project if and only if
(3)  α (e) ≥  α ̄ ≡   c H − v _v  ;
 (ii) Lobbying takes place if and only if
(4)  i _ q ≤  ( i __ q) 
R
 ≡   p H  v 2  _  c H − v. 
Note that if lobbying were assumed ex post—i.e., specific to the project’s type—
instead of ex ante, our results would remain qualitatively the same: in that case, 
lobbying would take place only when the project is bad and if  i / q ≤  v 2 / ( c H − v) .
The threshold  α ¯ > 0 defined in (3) measures the minimum influence that the 
industry must have to convince the regulator to allow all projects. According to (4), 
the occurrence of lobbying depends on the parameter  i / q , which measures the rela-
tive cost of influence, which is adjusted by the size of the project.
In the absence of lobbying, the social surplus generated by the industry is positive 
because the project is only allowed if it is good ( c =  c L ). We denote this first-best 
surplus by
(5)    L R =  p L (v −  c L ) q > 0. 
With industry lobbying, however, it may not be so. Expected welfare in that case 
can be written as
(6)    LH R =  p L (v −  c L ) q +  p H (v −  c H ) q − i α ¯ , 
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which differs from    L R in (5) by its second and third terms, which are both nega-
tive. The second term reflects the fact that the project is approved and undertaken 
even when it is bad. The third term further reduces social welfare by the indus-
try’s resources that have been sunk into lobbying. We assume, nevertheless, that 
the expected social welfare generated by the industry is nonnegative, despite the 
industry’s influence:
(7)    LH R ≥ 0. 
This rules out the uninteresting situation in which it would be socially optimal to 
simply prohibit all projects ex ante.
II. NGO Activism
Public regulators have certainly experienced a golden age. Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2003) explains the predominance of public regulation at the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries by the fact that it proved more resistant 
than other social control mechanisms in the face of growing industrial interests. 
Since then, however, regulators have, to a large extent, lost public trust, as argued 
by Aghion et al. (2010). Trust barometers further reveal that the public believes 
that industries are inadequately regulated, and trusts NGOs significantly more than 
public authorities. Accordingly, we suggest that the recent rise of NGO activism is 
a response to the failure of public regulation. Indeed, over the period 2002–2014 
in the United States, for example, NGOs’ criticisms against companies have been 
positively associated with prior increases in companies’ lobbying expenditures (see 
the details in online Appendix A).
We introduce in the model of Section I an activist NGO that may decide to inter-
fere in the regulatory process. We focus on confrontational activists that do not 
lobby regulators, but mobilize directly against the firm’s project, as in our introduc-
tory examples (e.g., Baron 2003, 2012).
Nature first determines whether the project is good or bad, which is observed by 
the regulator. In either case, the regulator decides whether to reject or approve it. 
If the project is not approved, nothing else happens—but if it is approved, activists 
enter the discourse.12
A. NGO-Industry Confrontation
When the project is approved by the regulator, the activists evaluate its external 
cost and decide whether to oppose it—the information available to activists and 
their assessment of the external cost will be detailed further below. As far as the 
12 The timing of actions, therefore, assumes that NGO opposition takes place after the regulatory decision 
whether to reject or approve the project. In some cases, however, NGOs identified potentially hazardous industrial 
projects that were still on the track for approval—i.e., before they were approved. Public regulation was sometimes 
sensitive to NGO opposition in these situations—as, for example, when fracking was banned by various US states 
and European governments. For an analysis of situations in which activists oppose firms’ projects first, until public 
regulation puts an end to the conflict, see Egorov and Harstad (2017).
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activists’ opposition is concerned, we rely on Baron’s (2012) model of confronta-
tional activism.13 Their opposition consists of two stages: activists first mobilize, 
then campaign if needed. No successful campaign can arise without prior mobiliza-
tion efforts. For example, in the 2004 conflict in which Rainforest Action Network 
opposed Citigroup’s financing of environmentally harmful projects, the NGO first 
committed personnel and earmarked funds to the issue, and engaged in specific pub-
lic communication, before demanding that the bank strengthen its environmental 
standards.14 In the first stage, the activists mobilize with an intensity
  m ≥ 0 
against the project. We assume that mobilization efforts  m are publicly observable 
and entail a dead weight loss  γ m , where  γ > 0 is the marginal cost of mobilizing. 
When  m = 0 , we say that the activists do not mobilize. In that case, the approved 
project is ultimately undertaken by the firm.
Facing mobilization, the industry can always self-regulate. Given an intensity of 
mobilization  m > 0 , the firm decides whether to abandon or continue the project. 
If the firm abandons the project, nothing else happens.
When the project is opposed but continued by the firm despite the mobilization, 
the activists launch a campaign against it with the intent to hurt the firm. For exam-
ple, in its conflict against Citigroup, Rainforest Action Network urged Citigroup 
cardholders to cut their cards into pieces and mail them to the bank. In the conflict 
between As You Sow and Dunkin’ Donuts, the former ultimately coordinated a hos-
tile shareholder resolution. These actions can take the form of calling for a boycott, 
mounting a cyber attack, launching a negative advertisement campaign, lawsuit, 
shareholder resolution, etc.15 This is the second stage of the activists’ opposition. 
In addition to the NGO’s mobilization efforts, a large variety of factors that are not 
under the NGO’s control determine the success of a campaign. Therefore, a cam-
paign randomly generates a harm  h ≥ 0 to the firm. We assume that  h is drawn 
from a uniform distribution of support  [0, m] :
(8)  h ∼ U [0, m] . 
Given the realized harm  h , the firm decides whether to concede to the campaign. 
If the firm does not concede and undertakes the project despite the campaign, it 
bears the harm  h that reduces its profit accordingly. If the firm concedes to the cam-
paign, it is only inflicted a fraction
  ω ∈  (0, 1) 
13 This model was inspired by the well-documented conflict in which the NGO Rainforest Action Network 
opposed Citigroup in 2004 (Baron and Yurday 2004).
14 In general, NGO mobilization involves public communication. This is reflected, for example, by the criti-
cisms leveled by NGOs against companies, which are described in online Appendix A.
15 Various modes of campaigning, including boycotts, lawsuits, and shareholder resolutions, may sometimes be 
directed to the news media and amount to harmful advertising. See, for example, Friedman (1999, 181–95) on the 
effects of boycotts.
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of the harm  h . That is, conflict always negatively impacts the firm, but less so when 
it ultimately concedes. In that case, the harm  ωh reflects the persistency of campaign 
damages, such as when society does not immediately forgive the firm after its con-
cession, which causes a loss in terms of reputation or brand value.
The timing of actions is summarized by the game form presented in Figure 1. The 
regulator acts first (after Nature has determined the project’s type), then the NGO, 
and finally the firm. The information set encompassing the NGO nodes represents 
the fact that the NGO does not observe whether the project is good or not, but only 
receives a signal about the external cost—see further below. Solid nodes indicate 
that the project is ultimately undertaken. Hollow nodes indicate that it is not, either 
because it has been rejected by the regulator, or because it has been abandoned by 
the firm. The firm may abandon the project after NGO mobilization, i.e., before a 
campaign—or, if it continues with the project, after the campaign or not at all. The 
game is solved backward, so as to select a subgame perfect equilibrium. We start 
with the firm’s decision.
B. The Firm’s Reaction to Activism
Our results are summarized by the following lemma—its proof is presented in 
online Appendix B.
Figure 1. Game Form
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LEMMA 1 (Firm’s reaction to activism): The firm will abandon the project
 (i) Either after a campaign if it is sufficiently harmful:
(9)  h ≥  h ˆ ≡  vq _ 
1 − ω; 
 (ii) Or immediately after a mobilization if it is sufficiently intense:
(10)  m ≥  m ¯ ≡ η (ω) vq, with η (ω) =  
⎧
 
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 1 _ 
 √  ω (1 − ω)  
if  0 < ω <  1 _
2
   
2
 
if    1 _
2
≤ ω < 1
 . 
In the  (ω, m) plane, Figure 2 represents the increasing curve  m =  h ˆ expressed 
in (9), the decreasing curve  m =  m ¯ expressed in (10), as well as the U-shaped 
curve  m =  m ˆ defined and used in the Proof of Lemma 1 (online Appendix B). 
The intersection of these curves at  ω = 1 / 2 implies two main cases of analysis. 
When a mobilization induces the firm to abandon the project immediately, we call it 
“strong.” When it does not, and no campaign causes the firm to concede, the mobi-
lization is called “weak.”
The Case of Highly Persistent Campaign Damages:  ω ≥ 1 / 2 .—As Figure 2 
shows,  ω ≥ 1 / 2 implies  m ¯ ≤  h ˆ . In that case, the mobilization is strong—inducing 
the firm to abandon the project immediately—if and only if  m ≥  m ¯ . Otherwise, the 
firm continues and the subsequent campaign necessarily satisfies  h <  h ˆ , because 
h ≤ m <  m ¯ ≤  h ˆ . Therefore, a mobilization that is not strong—inducing the firm 
Figure 2. Impact of NGO Mobilization and the NGO’s Optimal Strategies
ω0 1117
m
2vq
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2
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to continue—is, therefore, necessarily weak—not causing the firm to concede after 
a campaign. As will be clear shortly below, the activists are sensitive to the cost of 
mobilization; it cannot be optimal for the NGO to make unnecessarily costly mobi-
lization efforts. As a result, the NGO makes either the cost-effective strong mobi-
lization of intensity  m =  m ¯ —this is sufficient to induce the firm to abandon the 
project—or does not mobilize at all. Note that, when  ω ≥ 1/2 , no NGO campaign 
takes place in equilibrium. For the sake of completeness, we now examine the case 
of low persistent damages ( ω < 1/2 ), which is more complex.
The Case of Low Persistence of Damages:  ω < 1/2 .—By contrast, potentially 
successful NGO campaigns may take place when  ω < 1/2 . Indeed, Figure 2 shows 
that, in that case, there exist mobilizations that are neither weak, nor strong: mobi-
lization intensities  m ∈  ( h ˆ ,  m ¯ ) do not induce the firm to self-regulate immediately 
after the mobilization, but are able to generate successful campaigns to which the 
firm would concede. Therefore, there are three possible cost-effective options for the 
NGO, rather than two. The first option is not to mobilize at all ( m = 0 ). The second 
option is to make the strong mobilization efforts  m =  m ¯ that induce the firm to 
abandon the project immediately. The third option is to make intermediate mobili-
zation efforts  m ∈  ( h ˆ ,  m ¯ ) , knowing that the firm will not immediately self-regulate, 
but hoping that the subsequent campaign will be sufficiently successful to make it 
ultimately concede.
C. The NGO Choice of Mobilization Intensity
We depart from Baron’s (2012) assumption that the activists maximize social wel-
fare. Instead, we assume that they are solely concerned with the external cost   gener-
ated by the project. Indeed, as a matter of fact, activist NGOs are typically specialized 
in social, environmental, or risk-related issues, which they consider as priority. More 
precisely, the NGO chooses its mobilization intensity  m in such a way as to minimize
(11)  χ =  E N [ ] + γ m, 
where the superscript  N means that the expectation is conditional on the information 
available to the NGO—see below for details.
We focus on the case where  ω is not too low—i.e., campaign damages are suffi-
ciently persistent—to reflect the fact that reputational risk has become a major con-
cern for companies. As The Economist (January 22, 2004, Special Report on Risk) 
puts it, “The biggest risk any company faces is the loss of its good name, and you 
cannot insure against that.” Interestingly, the special report adds that “some of the 
most vigorous wreckers of reputations have been NGOs.” Even in the eventuality of 
a concession, therefore, a conflict with activists may be prohibitively costly in terms 
of both reputation and brand value.16
16 The Economist’s special report continues: “Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth now routinely picket and 
boycott firms of whose practices they disapprove, such as Nestlé, Esso, and Shell. Companies that do business in 
poor countries (e.g., Nike) are liable to find themselves charged with running sweatshops.”
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When  ω is not too low, online Appendix B establishes that the persistency of 
campaign damages is such an important concern for the firm that the NGO does 
not find it optimal to make intermediate mobilization efforts  m ∈  ( h ˆ ,  m ¯ ) , which 
do not induce the firm to immediately self-regulate. Indeed, in that context, if the 
firm decides to continue after the mobilization, the subsequent campaign is too 
unlikely to be successful. In this regard, online Appendix B identifies the threshold 
ω = 1/17 as critical. Therefore, we make the following assumption, which not 
only simplifies the analysis, but also eliminates situations of least relevance.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Campaign Damages Persistency): Campaign damages are suffi-
ciently persistent:
(12)  ω ≥  1 _ 
17
. 
The following proposition is obtained.
PROPOSITION 2 (NGO Mobilization Intensity): Under Assumption 1, no activists’ 
campaign occurs in equilibrium.
 (i) Either the NGO does not mobilize ( m = 0 ), and the project is undertaken by 
the firm;
 (ii) Or it mobilizes with the lowest intensity  m =  m ¯ that induces the firm to 
immediately abandon the project.
In Figure 2, these two mobilization intensities that may be optimal for the NGO 
appear in thick curves.
The proof is presented in online Appendix B. Assumption 1 implies that activist 
campaigns never occur in equilibrium; the resulting game form is represented in 
Figure 3. Therefore, it allows our analysis of the NGO-industry confrontation to 
focus on the industry’s self-regulation in the face of activists’ mobilization, high-
lighting the empirically most important facet of NGO activism. Admittedly, mobi-
lizations do not always suffice, such that firms sometimes concede to activists’ 
requests after harmful campaigns have been carried out.17 In our framework of anal-
ysis, campaigns might take place if the persistency of campaign damages were very 
low:  0 < ω < 1/17 —online Appendix B establishes the exact conditions under 
which they effectively occur. As a matter of fact, nevertheless, those campaigns are 
only the tip of the iceberg; in many more cases, although perhaps less noticeable, 
firms proactively self-regulate as they are confronted with a latent mobilization of 
NGO activists, in order to avoid the possibility of harmful campaigns (Baron 2003, 
36). Innes and Sam (2008), for example, finds empirical evidence that firms tend to 
17 As already mentioned, this was the case, for instance, in the 2004 conflict between Rainforest Action Network 
and Citigroup, in the 2012–2013 conflict between UK Uncut and Starbucks, and in the 2015 conflict between As 
You Sow and Dunkin’ Donuts. In fact, the most famous examples of NGO activism involve a campaign—for exam-
ple, a boycott—because such conflicts are the most noticeable manifestation of NGO opposition.
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self-regulate more when they are more likely objects of a consumer or environmen-
tal group boycott. Culling (2017, 58) defends the view that corporations are highly 
sensitive to reputation-destroying attacks by activists and examines how managers 
can, and why they should, avoid long-term reputational damage: in the event of a 
crisis, as he puts it, “corrective action is the only option” and “should be viewed in 
the context of avoiding an extension or exacerbation of the crisis.” 
We now characterize activists’ optimal choice to mobilize or not against the 
firm’s project.
D. The NGO Information and Decision
According to Proposition 2, the NGO’s optimal strategy is either not to mobilize 
( m = 0 ), in which case the project is undertaken, or to mobilize with the minimum 
effective intensity  m ¯ = η (ω) vq needed to induce the project’s abandonment. In the 
first case,  χ =  E N (c) q , where  E N (c) denotes the NGO’s assessment of the exter-
nal cost  c , while  χ = γη (ω) vq in the second. It follows that the NGO opposes the 
project if and only if
(13)  E N (c) ≥  s ¯ ≡ γη (ω) v. 
Otherwise, there is no mobilization and the project is undertaken.
Complete Information.—Suppose first, as in Baron’s (2012) original model, that 
the NGO is perfectly informed about the project’s external cost  c . It follows that 
the NGO opposes the project if and only if its external cost  c =  c L ,  c H exceeds the 
threshold  s ¯ expressed in (13). There are three possibilities: (i) if  s ¯ ≤  c L , the NGO 
always opposes the project, irrespective of whether it has a high cost  c H or a low cost 
c L <  c H . (ii) If  c H <  s ¯, on the contrary, the NGO always remains inactive: it never 
Nature
Regulator
Rejects
NGO
Mobilizes Does not
(m = 0)(m = m) (m = 0)
Approves
Good project
Regulator
NGO
Does not Mobilizes
Approves Rejects
Bad project
(m = m)
Figure 3. Reduced-Game Form after Two Steps of Backward Induction
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opposes the project, even when it perfectly knows that it is bad. (iii) Otherwise, 
c L <  s ¯ ≤  c H , and the perfectly-informed NGO only induces the abandonment of 
the project when it is bad, as in the first-best outcome. In either of cases (i) and (ii), 
the NGO is “extremist” in the sense that its decision is independent of the (perfect) 
information at its disposal, making the analysis less interesting.
No Information.—Suppose now that the NGO has no information at all on the 
project’s external cost. Whether the project is good or bad, the activists’ assessment 
of its cost is simply the prior  E N (c) =  p L  c L +  p H  c H . There are two possibilities. 
Either  s ¯ ≤  p L  c L +  p H  c H , in which case the NGO is also extremist: it systematically 
opposes the project despite the fact that it has no information at all about its cost. Or 
p L  c L +  p H  c H <  s ¯, in which case the NGO remains inactive when it is uninformed.
Incomplete Information.—Here, the assessment of the external cost  c by the activ-
ists depends on both their perception of the regulator’s behavior and the (imperfect) 
information at their disposal. We represent the latter as the following noisy signal on  c :
(14)  s = c + σε, 
where  ε is the realization of a random noise with zero mean, density  f (ε) , and cumu-
lative distribution function  F (ε) . We assume that  f is symmetric and single peaked 
at  ε = 0 . We also assume that  log ( f ) is strictly concave, implying the standard 
property that a higher signal  s indicates that a bad project is more likely. In (14),
  σ > 0 
measures the “opacity” of the industry: a higher parameter  σ reflects less transpar-
ency, and, therefore, less precise information available to the activists. The indus-
try’s degree of opacity results from various components: the complexity of industrial 
projects, the transparency of regulation, and the expertise of NGO activists.
The following assumption rules out the least interesting cases identified above.
ASSUMPTION 2 (Non-extremist NGO): 
 (i) If the NGO were perfectly informed—as when  σ tends to zero—it would 
oppose the project when it is bad:
(15)  s ¯ <  c H ; 
 (ii) If it were not informed at all—as when  σ tends to infinity—it would not oppose 
any project:
(16)  p L  c L +  p H  c H <  s ¯. 
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Note that (16) implies
(17)  s ¯ >  c L ; 
i.e., a non-extremist perfectly informed NGO would not oppose a good 
project.
Assumption 2 allows our analysis to focus on the most interesting—and least 
obvious—case of an imperfectly informed NGO that would not remain inactive if it 
perfectly knew that the project was bad, but would not oppose it if it had no infor-
mation at all.
In this context, the NGO opposition decision in the subgame perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium is resolved in details in online Appendix B. The results are summarized 
by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3 (NGO Opposition): 
 (i) If the regulator rejects bad projects, the NGO never mobilizes.
 (ii) If the regulator approves all projects, regardless of whether they are good or 
bad, the NGO mobilizes (and induces the firm to abandon its project) with 
probability
(18)  Φ H (σ) ≡ F (  c H −  s ˆ(σ)  _σ ) 
  when the project is bad, and probability
(19)  Φ L (σ) ≡ F (  c L −  s ˆ(σ)  _σ ) <  Φ H (σ) 
  when it is good.
 (iii) As  σ increases and the industry becomes less transparent, the NGO 
 mobilization probability  Φ H (σ) decreases;  Φ L (σ) is single peaked.
The proof is presented in online Appendix B. Probabilities  Φ L (σ) and  Φ H (σ) are 
depicted in Figure 4.
The inverted-U shape of the NGO opposition probability  Φ L (σ) means that, 
perhaps surprisingly, more transparency may induce more good projects to 
be abandoned. This property is consistent with the two following limit cases. If 
the NGO were perfectly informed that the project is good—as when  σ tends 
to zero—Assumption 2.1 implies that it would not oppose the project at all: 
 lim σ→+∞  Φ L (σ) = 0 . If the NGO had no information—as when  σ tends to infin-
ity—it would not oppose it either, by Assumption 2.2: both  Φ L (σ) and  Φ H (σ) tend 
to zero in that case.
The next section examines how NGO opposition affects public regulation.
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III. Public Regulation with NGO Opposition
Moving one step further back in the sequence of actions represented in Figure 3, 
we now consider the regulator’s decision whether to reject the project when it is bad. 
If it does, this will be correctly anticipated by activists and NGO mobilization will 
never occur; in that case, the first-best outcome is realized. In contrast, if the regula-
tor decides to approve the project when it is bad, the NGO will mobilize against the 
project with probability  Φ H (σ) given in (18).
We assume that the regulator does not internalize the cost of NGO mobilization: 
its objective is the same as (1). However, in the presence of activists, the implemen-
tation of the project becomes uncertain. Therefore, the regulator’s objective must be 
written in expected terms:18
   = E [ (1 + α (e) ) π − ] . 
It follows that the minimum influence threshold  α ¯ required for the regulator to 
accept a bad project is the same as in Section I, regardless of the presence of activ-
ists. However, the presence of an NGO reduces the stakes of lobbying. Indeed, the 
industry anticipates that, if a bad project were accepted, it might ultimately be aban-
doned with probability  Φ H (σ) > 0 due to NGO opposition.
PROPOSITION 4 (Regulation and Lobbying with NGO Opposition): In the pres-
ence of an NGO, lobbying takes place if and only if
(20)  σ ≥  σ RN ( i _ q) ≡  Φ H −1 (1 −  ( i _ q)   c H − v _ p H  v 2  ) . 
18 Online Appendix D explains how the analysis would be modified if the regulator internalized the social cost 
of NGO mobilizations, or if he incurred a private reputational cost from their occurrence.
σσ˜
ΦH (σ)
ΦL (σ)
ΦL ,ΦH
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1
Figure 4. Probability of NGO Opposition to Good ( Φ L ) and Bad ( Φ H ) Projects
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The proof of Proposition 4 is presented in online Appendix B. Its result is 
illustrated in Figure 5 in the ( i/q ,  σ ) plane. It shows that the threshold function 
 σ RN (i/q) exhibits an asymptote at level  (i/q) R , the lobbying threshold in the 
absence of an NGO. Indeed, when  σ is infinite—i.e., without information—there is 
no NGO opposition, so that lobbying takes place under the same condition whether 
there is an NGO or not.
In the absence of lobbying, there is no NGO opposition, so the social surplus 
generated by the industry is the first-best level, as in (5):
(21)   L RN =   L R =  p L (v −  c L ) q > 0. 
When the industry lobbies effectively, however, expected welfare becomes
(22)     LH RN =  p L [ (1 −  Φ L (σ) ) (v −  c L ) −  Φ L (σ) γη (ω) v] q 
 +  p H [ (1 −  Φ H (σ) ) (v −  c H ) −  Φ H (σ) γη (ω) v] q − i α ¯ . 
As in Section I, we rule out the uninteresting situation in which it would be 
socially optimal to simply shut down the industry by assuming19
(23)   LH RN ≥ 0. 
19 In some cases, however, industry projects were banned only because they were meeting NGO opposition. This 
was especially evident when France banned GMO cultivation in 2014: the decision was justified by the opposition 
of the public, as demonstrated by opinion polls and by activists’ destruction of experimental GMO fields (Reuters, 
May 5, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/05/france-gmo-idUSL6N0NR2MZ20140505).
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Figure 5. Occurrence of Industry Lobbying in the Presence of an NGO
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The next section characterizes the occurrence of lobbying with and without an 
NGO.
IV. Occurrence of Industry Lobbying, Endogenous NGO Entry, and Welfare Analysis
In this section, we first characterize the circumstances under which industry lob-
bying takes place with and without an NGO. Then, we endogenize the NGO entry 
decision and examine the welfare impact of this decision.
According to Propositions 1 and 4, the occurrence of lobbying depends on both 
the relative cost of influence and the degree of transparency in the industry. The fol-
lowing corollary is immediately obtained—see online Appendix B.
COROLLARY 1 (Occurrence of Lobbying): 
 (i) For high relative costs of influence  i/q >  (i/q) R , lobbying never takes 
place, regardless of whether there is an NGO or not.
 (ii) For low relative costs of influence  i/q ≤  (i/q) R and
  (a) Low degrees of transparency  σ ≥  σ RN (i/q) , the industry always lobbies;
  (b)  High degrees of transparency  σ <  σ RN (i/q) , the industry lobbies in the 
absence of an NGO, and does not otherwise.
The corollary shows that the presence of an NGO limits the occurrence of indus-
try lobbying, as is illustrated in the ( i/q ,  σ ) plane in Figure 6.
A. Endogenous NGO Entry
Sections I and III examined the performance of an industry with and without 
an NGO. We now endogenize the NGO’s entry decision.20 When the NGO enters, 
activists dedicate resources to the monitoring of the industry’s project and, based 
on the information they collect, decide whether to oppose this project in the way 
described above.
The NGO enters when it believes that this will reduce its valuation  χ of the 
expected external cost inclusive of the cost of mobilizing against the project. 
Therefore, we compare  χ in the presence and absence of the NGO in the industry, in 
the three situations identified in Corollary 1.
Consider first the situation in which industry lobbying never takes place and the 
regulator only approves the project when it is good. In this case, there is no NGO 
opposition, even in the presence of the NGO, as per Proposition 4. With or without 
the NGO, the activists’ cost valuation is
(24)  χ L R =  χ L NR =  p L  c L q. 
20 The coordination of individual activists and the NGO’s formation are beyond the scope of this paper.
202 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: ECONOMIC POLICY NOVEMBER 2019
NGO entry, therefore, would not reduce the cost valuation  χ of activists.
Second, consider the situation in which industry lobbying only induces the 
approval of a bad project in the absence of the NGO. In that case, Proposition 1 
implies that the activists’ cost valuation is
(25)  χ LH R =  ( p L  c L +  p H  c H ) q, 
which is greater than in (24). Therefore, the NGO’s entry causes a change 
 χ L RN −  χ LH R < 0 . In that case, the activists always enter.
Third, consider the situation in which the industry lobbies the regulator regard-
less of the NGO’s presence. In the absence of the NGO, the activists’ cost valuation 
is given by (25), which is to be compared with their valuation in the presence of 
NGO opposition. By Propositions 2 and 3, the latter is21
(26)      χ LH RN =  p L [ (1 −  Φ L (σ) )  c L +  Φ L (σ) γη (ω) v] q 
 +  p H [ (1 −  Φ H (σ) )  c H +  Φ H (σ) γη (ω) v] q. 
Analysis of the difference  χ LH RN −  χ LH R yields that the NGO always enters in that 
case—see the proof in online Appendix B. The above results are summarized by the 
following proposition.
21 At this stage, the expected cost valuation of activists is an expectation not only over the realization of the 
project (good or bad), but also over the realization of the signal  s , which depends on the project’s type.
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Figure 6. Occurrence of Industry Lobbying with and without an NGO
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PROPOSITION 5 (NGO Entry and Industry Lobbying): The activist NGO enters if 
and only if  0 < i/q ≤  (i/q) R —i.e., whenever the industry lobbies in its absence.22
B. NGO-Induced Welfare Improvement
The question arises whether the entry decision of the NGO activists analyzed in 
the previous subsection contributes to improve welfare. Indeed, the NGO is only 
concerned with the expected cost  χ =  E N [ + γm] which, unlike social welfare
(27)   = E [π −  − γm − iα] = E [π − χ − iα] , 
does not take into account the industry’s profit and cost of lobbying.
To address the welfare impact of the NGO’s entry, it is useful to first establish 
the circumstances under which this entry deters industry lobbying. We do so in the 
following corollary—see online Appendix B.
COROLLARY 2 (NGO’s Deterrence of Lobbying): NGO entry deters industry lob-
bying if and only if  σ <  σ RN (i/q) —i.e., whenever the information at its disposal is 
sufficiently precise.
We now examine the impact on welfare of the NGO’s entry decision. When indus-
try lobbying never takes place and the regulator only approves the project when it is 
good, the first-best outcome is realized despite the fact that the NGO does not enter. 
Social welfare in that case is given by (21), which would not be improved by the 
NGO’s entry.
When industry lobbying is deterred by the NGO’s entry, the first-best welfare 
level (21) is restored: indeed, the mere presence of the NGO is sufficient in that case, 
and NGO mobilization is not needed: the NGO’s entry is always desirable.
Finally, when industry lobbying takes place regardless of whether there is an 
NGO or not, social welfare   LH R without an NGO, as given in (6), is to be compared 
with its counterpart   LH RN in the presence of an NGO, as given in (22). Analysis of 
the difference yields the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 6 (Welfare Impact of NGO Activism):
 (i) NGO entry always improves social welfare when it deters industry lobbying.
 (ii) When it does not deter lobbying, NGO entry improves welfare if
  (a)  Mobilizations are not too costly:  γ <  γ ¯ ≡   c H − v _η (ω) v ;
  (b)  And there is enough transparency in the industry:  σ <  σ ∗ (γ) , where 
 σ ∗ (γ) is defined in online Appendix B.
22 It should be clear from Corollary 1, however, that NGO entry does not necessarily deter lobbying.
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The proof of Proposition 6 is presented in online Appendix B. Its result 
is represented in Figure 7. In panel A, the cost of NGO mobilization is high 
( γ ≥  γ ¯): NGO entry only improves welfare when it deters lobbying (hatched area). 
In panel B, the cost of NGO mobilization is low ( γ <  γ ¯). In that case, there exists a 
threshold degree of opacity  σ ∗ (γ) > 0 —decreasing in the mobilization efficiency 
parameter  γ —below which the NGO’s entry is optimal, not because it deters indus-
try lobbying, but because NGO activists can efficiently oppose harmful industrial 
projects (vertically hatched area).
In environments favorable to the industry’s influence, the involvement of NGO 
activists may become optimal for society for two reasons. First, NGOs tend to deter 
industry lobbying. Thus, in the presence of an NGO, regulation is less vulnerable to 
the industry’s influence. Second, even when the industry’s influence is unavoidable, 
activists directly oppose industrial projects.
Yet NGO opposition is a costly way to fight an industry’s influence on its regula-
tion, not only because NGO-industry conflicts are socially costly, but also because 
NGOs sometimes pick the wrong target. Indeed, our analysis stresses the crucial role 
of transparency. As Figure 7 illustrates, a perfectly informed NGO—as when  σ tends 
to zero and the diagram reduces to its horizontal axis—would always improve welfare, 
despite the fact that its mobilization is socially costly: its presence would systemati-
cally deter the influence of the industry on regulation, making NGO opposition unnec-
essary. Some opacity ( σ > 0 ) is needed to explain the fact that NGO entry does not 
necessarily deter lobbying and that NGO mobilizations effectively take place.
When an NGO becomes more efficient and when its information improves, 
it chooses better targets and reaches them in a less costly way. In that context, 
Proposition 6 demonstrates that NGO opposition has the potential to improve the 
existing regulatory system.
V.  Implications for the Rise of NGO Activism
Our theory can be used to explain the increasing involvement of NGOs in sev-
eral industries over the past few decades. In a nutshell, our view is that the size and 
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Figure 7. Optimality of NGO Entry
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value of industrial projects (and thus the stakes of lobbying) have grown dramat-
ically, while the cost of influence has not increased in most countries (and proba-
bly decreased in some). Public regulation has thus become more vulnerable. At the 
same time, conditions have favored NGOs’ efficiency, such as the rise of commu-
nication technologies and the resulting dissemination of information. As a result, 
NGOs have increasingly sought to oppose the hazardous projects of industries that 
are difficult to regulate.
A. The Rising Scale of Projects and the 
Resulting Influence of the Industry on Public Regulation
In Western countries, firms have typically grown in size rapidly in the last three 
decades. More and more, multinational conglomerates operate in oil and energy pro-
duction, banking, retailing, food production, new technologies, etc. This is mainly 
because technology accelerated economies of scale and increased entry costs (Bollard, 
Klenow, and Li 2014; Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi 2017), thereby “allowing the 
biggest firms to get bigger unhindered by competition” (The Economist 2015).23 In 
developing countries, businesses have grown in size both because of economic devel-
opment and because super big companies emerged from state capitalism.
At the same time, industrial projects have grown bigger, whether in size or valua-
tion, and their potential external damages have scaled up accordingly. For example, 
outcomes such as the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the Fukushima disaster, and 
the global financial crisis became catastrophes because the units involved were of 
record size.24
Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) shows that public regulation was the optimal way for 
society to regulate business in Western countries between the start of the Progressive 
Era, and, roughly, the Second World War. However, the progressive program could 
not keep its promises in the face of today’s enormous stakes. The contemporary era 
instead sees Western governments under the thumb of super-big multinationals and 
not in a position to impose adequate standards on them. In some sectors, businesses 
are so powerful that they manage to effectively distort regulation incentives with 
enormous political contributions, ubiquitous lobbying efforts, occasional corrup-
tion, or more complex and subtle forms of influence. This has been the case of 
energy regulation in many instances, but also of the regulation of the banking sector 
and the food and drugs industries worldwide.
B. The Rising Efficiency of NGO Activism
When governments and regulators have failed to impose adequate standards 
for powerful businesses, NGOs have gotten increasingly effective at mobilizing to 
23 The Economist. 2015. “The Bigger, the Less Fair,” March 12. https://www.economist.com/
finance-and-economics/2015/03/12/the-bigger-the-less-fair.
24 It is remarkable that the Deepwater Horizon rig was drilling the deepest oil well in history, and that the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was one of the 15 largest power stations in the world. Furthermore, when 
businesses are interconnected, as in the banking sector, firm size is more critical than ever, because interconnection 
magnifies the social damages of misconduct.
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address such failures.25 Opposition to super-big corporations and projects seems 
inherent to the rise of NGOs, both because big businesses are typically suspected 
of causing the greatest harm, and because they are more vulnerable to reputational 
risks.
Another remarkable change that has characterized the last few decades is the 
emergence of the internet and associated communication technologies (ICT, here-
after). As Nye (2004) points out, the ICT revolution has dramatically accelerated 
the rise of NGOs. According to our theory, there are two important aspects: infor-
mation quality and mobilization efficiency. First, the ICT revolution has facilitated 
NGOs’ ability to identify issues to oppose. Indeed, information is increasingly being 
disseminated at the global level about everything and, a fortiori, about industrial 
projects and their regulatory treatment. To sum up, in the words of The Economist, 
“The Internet [has] greatly improved transparency. Corporate secrets are becoming 
ever harder to keep.” 26, 27 Second, the ICT revolution greatly improved the ways in 
which the public can be mobilized through social media, as well as NGOs’ ability to 
coordinate their efforts through networks.28
C. NGO Activism as a Response to These Recent Changes
According to our theory, therefore, the economy has moved, over the last few 
decades, in the southwest direction in the diagrams in Figure 7. On the one hand, 
in the face of greater industrial stakes, public regulation has become more suscep-
tible to pressure from industry to approve hazardous projects. In our model, this 
means a fall in the relative cost of influence  i/q . On the other hand, NGO activism 
has benefitted from improved communication technologies and gotten increasingly 
better at targeting harmful projects. This means a fall in the parameter  σ measuring 
opacity. Our theory, therefore, suggests that the involvement of NGO activists was a 
response to the recent changes described above.
The remaining question is whether this response was legitimate from the per-
spective of society as a whole. For example, Nye (2004) considers that the rise of 
NGO opposition has contributed to social progress. Improved communication tech-
nologies have not only generated more transparency, but also favored activists’ effi-
ciency in opposing targeted projects. This means a fall in the cost of mobilization  γ : 
the economy would have moved from the diagram on the left in Figure 7 to the dia-
gram on the right, and in the southwest direction in the latter. In that context, NGO 
opposition was more likely to be socially optimal as  σ decreased, for two reasons. 
25 For example, our analysis already mentioned the effective opposition to Nike’s outsourced production man-
agement, Citigroup’s project funding, HSBC’s risk management, TransCanada’s and Shell’s energy-related proj-
ects, Starbucks’s tax-avoidance scheme, and Dunkin’s Donuts’s use of chemicals.
26 The Economist. 2004. “Easy to Lose,” January 22. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2004/01/24/
easy-to-lose.
27 Baron (2003, 34–35) illustrates the changes in NGO strategies that resulted from the ICT revolution. For 
example, he describes environmental activists’ rapid circulation of information released by the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Similarly, an essay by the head of a NASA research institute was circulated in 2011, which 
informed NGOs about the Keystone XL pipeline’s being on the track for approval.
28 This is well illustrated by recent mobilizations, such as the opposition to TransCanada’s exploratory drilling 
in Québec in 2014.
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On the one hand, NGOs became better at detecting the most hazardous projects. On 
the other hand, with more transparency, NGOs became more  effective at deterring 
industry lobbying. For example, over the period 2002–2014 in the United States, 
NGOs’ criticisms have been negatively associated with companies’ subsequent lob-
bying expenditures (see the details in online Appendix A). Thus, our theory tells that 
the rise of NGO activism is socially optimal if the joint decrease in  σ and  γ has been 
sufficiently marked.
D. Other Possible Policy Responses
Ahead of more vulnerable public regulation, our theory suggests other responses 
besides NGO activism that could contribute to social progress. The first and most 
obvious would be to strengthen regulation’s ability to resist industry influence by 
increasing the cost of influence  i . This is, for example, the message of the Tobin 
Project initiative and of Carpenter and Moss’s (2014) book, which calls for more 
attention to how the influence of special interests can be limited. Especially in reac-
tion to the global financial crisis, the call for the prevention of capture found a par-
ticular echo in the US policy arena in 2009–2010, with the creation of new agencies 
under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The question still arises, however, how agencies 
should be designed to increase their independence (see, for example, the measures 
suggested by Sheng 2012, 157).29
The second response would be to increase transparency in regulatory affairs, 
which amounts to decreasing  σ . NGOs often call for more transparency.30 In turn, 
more transparency in regulation is likely to contribute to limiting special interests’ 
influence over regulators and policymakers by improving the latter’s accountability.
Last, the cost of NGO opposition  γ could be lowered by involving NGOs more 
directly in the regulatory process. For example, in his measures to prevent regula-
tory capture, Sheng (2012) suggests the empowerment of stakeholders as a counter-
vailing power. This raises other questions, such as the independence of NGOs, that 
go beyond the scope of our analysis.
E. The Legal Status of NGO Activism
Our theory rests on the assumption that the rise of NGOs occurred when activ-
ists perceived that their involvement would be an effective way to contribute to the 
29 Indeed, as shown by Gibson Brandon and Padovani (2011), strengthened regulation—as per the Dodd-Frank 
Act—has led to an increase in lobbying efforts by the US banking industry. Their finding is consistent with our the-
ory: starting from an environment highly favorable to the industry’s influence, an increase in  i that is not sufficient 
to deter lobbying only increases influence expenditures  i α ¯ .
30 US environmentalists, for example, backed legislation by which the EPA must make information about chem-
ical emissions public. Similarly, in states in which fracking is approved by regulation, anti-fracking activists have 
often demanded, with some success, that the fluids injected underground be disclosed. The idea that transparency 
must be improved has also found a particular echo in the debate on financial regulation; improved transparency was 
one objective of the Dodd-Frank Act. Moreover, the academic literature on financial regulation has suggested that 
the disclosure of financial data collected by regulators to third parties may improve regulators’ incentives (Landier 
and Thesmar 2011).
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resolution of externalities. This is only possible when and where NGO activism is 
allowed by the legal environment.
Notably, the legal status of activism is ambiguous in most countries. Activism is 
generally tolerated by law in developed countries; sometimes, it is even guaranteed 
some financial independence.31 Yet the right to protest only applies as long as pro-
tests do not break the law. When activist campaigns involve extreme behavior, activ-
ists often run the risk of legal repercussions. Even peaceful actions, such as calls 
for boycotts, may violate refusal-to-deal, anti-discrimination, and  anti-defamation 
laws.32
The legal protection of NGO activism is a more urgent issue for developing 
countries. In transitional economies and emerging markets, NGOs are often banned, 
especially in autocratic governments, on the ground that their opposition to the 
industry destroys business—see, e.g., The Economist.33 Our analysis calls for more 
protection of NGOs, and especially in these contexts, so that NGOs can effectively 
play their role of countervailing and disciplinary power.
VI. Conclusion
To sum up, this theory holds that public regulation becomes vulnerable to the 
industrial stakes both when the cost of influence declines and economic activity 
grows. In either case, NGO activists may enter. When NGOs are sufficiently effi-
cient and transparency allows them to be sufficiently well informed, activism against 
industrial projects is warranted. Our theory highlights the fundamental importance 
of transparency. Activists may only countervail the industry’s influence if they have 
access to information of a sufficient quality to distinguish a bad project from a good 
one.
Two aspects are absent from the framework presented above, but are  discussed 
in online Appendix D. First, our analysis carries over unchanged to the apparently 
more complex case in which the firm is able to make lobbying efforts that are  specific 
to the project’s type. Second, the analysis accommodates situations in which the 
 regulator is directly affected by NGO opposition. For example, McDonnell and 
Werner (2016) shows that policymakers are less willing to  associate with firms 
targeted by activists. Our results remain qualitatively the same under the assump-
tion that the regulator is directly affected by NGO opposition to a project that 
it approved. The extension, nevertheless, highlights that the regulator’s sensitive-
ness to NGO mobilization reinforces the result that the NGO presence can deter 
 industry lobbying.
This paper is in line with Glaeser and Shleifer’s (2003) analysis of the rise of 
public regulation at the dawn of the twentieth century—see also Shleifer (2012). 
Glaeser and Shleifer explain the predominance of public regulation over private 
31 For instance, the Dutch government financially supports human rights activist groups.
32 It is on these grounds, for example, that several calls for boycotts by the French consumer association UFC 
have been declared unlawful. For its call to boycott Shell in response to the wreck of the Amoco-Cadiz oil tanker, 
the UFC was fined a prohibitive amount, which corresponded to Shell’s estimated lost sales.
33 The Economist. 2015. “Who’s Afraid of the Activists?” May 9. https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/05/09/
whos-afraid-of-the-activists. 
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litigation by the fact that the former proved less vulnerable than the latter in the 
face of growing industrial stakes. We suggest that during the second half of the 
twentieth century, the size and value of industrial projects (and thus the stakes of 
 lobbying) have grown dramatically. Public regulatory decisions have thus become 
more vulnerable to the influence of large companies. At the same time, conditions 
have favored NGOs’ efficiency, such as the rise of communication technologies and 
the resulting dissemination of information. As a result, NGOs have increasingly 
sought to oppose the hazardous projects of industries that are difficult to regulate. 
In other words, NGO activism has been one way society can rebalance public and 
private interests—as a complement to public regulation.
The objective of activist NGOs need not be aligned with the preferences of soci-
ety as a whole. Provided they are not extremist, their opposition is reminiscent of 
Coasian bargaining. According to Coase (1960), bargaining’s appeal is its potential 
to resolve externalities when transaction costs are low. In this respect, we point 
to two costs of NGO activism. First, NGO mobilizations and campaigns consume 
financial and human resources that could be used elsewhere. Second, activists may 
mistakenly oppose socially beneficial projects partly due to their imperfect informa-
tion. We argue that the internet and social media have contributed to a decrease in 
both types of costs.
In this paper, we have focused on the influential aspect of industry lobbying. 
Indeed, as justified in Section I, lobbying is more a matter of influence than infor-
mation. Moreover, our analysis deals with regulators, who are appointed for their 
expertise. In that context, the most remarkable asymmetry of information is not 
between the industry and its regulators, but between, on the one hand, the industry 
and its regulators, and, on the other hand, NGO activists who have no direct access 
to industrial projects.
Informational lobbying is, however, probably more relevant for other branches of 
governments than it is for public regulation. Legislators, for example, rely on a sub-
stantial amount of information that is provided not only by the industry but also by 
NGOs. In such a context, the analysis of the role of NGOs is more difficult because 
informational lobbying impacts the degree of transparency. On the one hand, it is 
often argued that competition among information providers improves the incentive 
to disclose truthful information (Dewatripont and Tirole 1999). On the other hand, 
however, this competition may generate more opacity for two reasons. First, infor-
mation externalities tend to discourage the collection/production of information by 
interest groups (Bennedsen and Feldmann 2006). Second, interest groups may seek 
to undermine the credibility of other groups, weakening the transmission of infor-
mation to decision makers (Chiroleu-Assouline and Lyon 2016). Clearly, the role of 
NGOs in contexts of informational lobbying is an exciting and promising field for 
future research.
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